The right-wing populism of the New Right shares many characteristics with the right-wing populism in Europe and right-wing populism in the American past. Among the commonalities are a sense of victimhood, intense nationalism, fear of cultural pluralism, and the potential for acceptance of conspiracy theories and authoritarianism.
In 1984 ,the French National Front became the first European right-populist party to escape marginalization at the polls by combining nationalist xenophobia with ant-government establishment nationalism. The combination of these issues represented a successful "master frame"– as the European scholars call it, which was soon copied by emerging similar parties in Europe. They were also partially successful in overcoming the stigma of anti-democratic policies, authoritarianism, and biological racism that they inherited from similar movements earlier in the Twentieth Century. These parties attracted largely working class voters, people who generally would have stayed with left and socialist parties had then shown any inclination to address the economic threats posed by postindustrial society.
Once convinced that their old parties could not or would not deal with the problems growing out of the global economy, these voters looked to express their concerns about declining social status and threats to their cultural values. Biological racism is no longer acceptable in Europe, so these new parties adopt what some call "culturalracism," but they claim not to go beyond pointing out that new subcultures are incompatible with the European heritage. The claim that the new subcultures would bring about the extinction of the older European tradition caused great fear and rage, emotions likely to cement political affiliations and mobilize voters. Anti-political establishment populism was very attractive to them because they were convinced that the liberals and socialists in power no longer cared about them and richly deserved punishment. Leaders of the new right-populist parties portrayed themselves as being outside the political class. People who have lost faith in government and their old political party are more likely to form new cognitive routes to interpret reality.
It is difficult to establish how much racism attends right-wing populism in the United States. It is rarely an overt element, and appeals to it are masked at as calls for law and order and criticisms of people who are alleged to lack the work ethic. Right-wing populism in both Europe and the United States is marked by intense nationalism, fear of cultural pluralism, and contempt for much of the heritage of the Enlightenment.
Some believe that right wing populism is an ante-room to fascism, but worries about this cannot be entertained until Republican populists have serious violated constitutionalism and deprived others of basic rights. The New Right has demonstrated strong authoritarian tendencies by drastically limiting the rights of the minority in the House of Representatives and threatening to strip the Senate minority of certain filibuster rights. There is also an on-going effort to muzzle progressive professors. The Right has consistently attempted to intimidate the media into providing coverage it considers suitable. However, none of this represents clear violations of law, and intemperate rhetoric is not an acid acid test for fascism.
Polish writer Adam Michnik suggested that populism always contains an element of envy and employs demagoguery. When mixed with intense nationalism, it can produce fascism. After 9/11 intense nationalism was wed to right- wing populism , producing an irresistible political force Populist nationalists have learned that extreme nationalist and aggressive policies can forge powerful political majorities, and they have been unable to refrain from regular use of this very effective political ploy. Provoking hatred of foreign enemies as well as fellow Americans who happen to disagree is too effective a tool not to deploy whenever necessary. Republicans used it to tar opponents as allies of terrorists and Saddam Hussein, increasing their majorities in the House and Senate and reelecting their warrior-hero George W. Bush.
The traditional conservative thinker John Lukacs wrote, "when...temperance is weak, or unenforced, or unpopular, then democracy is nothing else than populism. More precisely : then it is nationalist populism....the fundamental problem of the future." Right-wing populism easily morphed into nationalist populism. Anyone objecting to any policy claimed to be part of the war on terrorism was likely to have her patriotism questioned. Jim Gibbons, a Republican Congressman from Nebraska, was to say it was "too damn bad we didn’t buy {critics of the Iraq war} tickets to become human shields there. He also said those who complained about corporate contributions to President Bush were "communists. " Such outbursts are relatively rare because they tend to spook independent voters, but his remarks accurately reflect the spirit of nationalist populism. There were many other ways to say the same thing without alarming independents and moderates.
So far the union of right-wing populism and extreme nationalism has not produced fascism, but it has clearly threatened the health of our democratic polity. John Lukacs believes the new populism could almost destroy democracy because it so easily degenerates into the tyranny of the majority. 'Nationalism is a very low and cheap common denominator that unites people,'' Lukacs says. ''It is hatred that unites people. People take satisfaction from the idea that we are good because our enemies are evil. This is a very American syndrome, but it is also universally true of mankind.'' Lukacs was one of the few conservative intellectuals to object to Senator Joseph McCarthy; it is likely that he will have even less company this time around.
Previous manifestations of American right-wing populism have had the quality of a Roman candle. They burned brightly but fairly briefly. There were the anti-Semitic followers of Father Charles Coughlin, the anti-Communist crusaders led by Senator Joseph McCarthy who also the American WASP establishment, and the anti-black backlash populists of George C. Wallace. In many ways ,Wallace pioneered in developing many of the arguments employed by the today’s New Right. Those three movements were short lived because their extremism quickly became obvious. This lesson has been learned by right-wing populist strategist here and abroad.
Especially in the United States, the movement has continued to grow over three decades because its extremist tendencies have been somewhat contained and masked. The New Right constitutes a serious threat to democracy, and will probably result in drastically remodeling how the Congress and Executive Branch do business. Popular pressure will probably further mute the mainstream press, but in the short term official assaults on individual rights may not exceed what was accomplished in the Patriot Act. The drift toward authoritarianism will most likely be contained because rapid progress in that direction could alarm a large portion of the electorate.
Friday, April 29, 2005
Thursday, April 28, 2005
The New Right, Right-Wing Populism, and Displaced Economic Anxiety
Historically, movements for social change have often been instruments of status groups that felt an intense need to assert and legitimize their identities. Right wing populism, here in the form of the New Right and abroad, usually is fed by the bitterness and frustration of people facing status loss. These people do not want to be like people in the so-called "blue" states; they are simply intent upon expressing their identity as "decent" people and their anger over being mistreated because of that decency. Their status group anger has been framed in terms of authenticity. They are the real Americans as opposed to the phoneys.
Economic stagnation and the breakdown of welfare capitalism in the United States disoriented millions of people, who sought answers and affirmation of their identities. One might expect them to drift into a political movement that clearly and directly addressed their situation. However, cultural arguments touch people more deeply, and they were to accept an ideology that somewhat tangentially offered them some economic relief. Economic historian Alexander Cershenkron noted that even nations with long democratic traditions can become democracies without democrats. It is not so difficult to have a generous view of fellow citizens when living standards are rising. Economic growth makes the expansion of democracy possible. When people's ecopnomic prospects are declining, it is so much easier to be less inclusive, less trusting, and more inclined to accept views that place blame on a nation's woes on others.
The 2004 US election provides clear evidence of the extent to which anxiety rooted in economic concerns was displaced to
cultural matters. Sixty one percent of white voters refused to support John Kerry. In 1991, Stanley Greenberg wrote that "unless thre are some limits to the [ Democratic] party's moral agnosticism," it will not win over the averagfe family.
In Europe, those who lost their jobs, faced great insecurity or had to accept less income and benefits are loosely called the "abandoned workers." In the United States, there is a very broad definition of middle class, and the New Right here is considered a middle class phenomenon. Among the recruits to
right-wing populism were many Reagan Democrats, who faced great economic insecurity but also believed their cultural and religious values were under assault.
What has emerged in the last thirty years, is a self-conscious status group in the United States, the members of which would not object to the descriptive term "Middle America." Over time, this vast status group became desperate and anxious, believing their social and economic positions were slipping or in danger of slipping.. These middle class Americans developed a sub-culture or collective consciousness made up of orientations that guide their actions, particularly at election time. These orientations represent a form of conservative populism. Invariably, conservative populists identified their own fates with that of the nation, which also faced very grave threats. They, like their nation, were virtuous and deserved primacy among other people and nations. Their opponents were not just somewhat wrong, they were "evil."
Max Weber argued that there is a strong need for psychic comfort or a feeling of established worthiness. He thought that class consciousness was essentially "psychological thoughts of men about their lives. " In this instance, we are not dealing with a class. Status groups also a very similar form of consciousness, and in the late Twentieth Century marketing and other techniques that make it possible to frame information and arguments in such a way as to shape the content of that consciousness. Weber believed the most compelling ideologies developed when a powerful set of ideas were taken up by the disadvantaged. That is why it was so important to persuade a vast slice of middle Americans, regardless of their economic status, that they are somehow disadvantaged.
Today, the party of the right-wing populists controls every branch of the national government state governments. Nevertheless, the anger of the right-wing populists has not abated because they believe that the media, press, universities, and entertainment are still dominated by liberals who are committed to destroying American culture. To some degree the belief that they are conspired against victims is a tonic and confers upon them special identities. They cannot congratulate themselves on their political success or the fact that the press largely has been intimidated into soft-pedalling or ignoring stories that would offend conservatives. Their radio and television shockmeisters continually remind them that they are not safe as long as there is a Hillary Clinton or Ted Kennedy in the Senate or as long as The New York Times or Washington Post remain in print.
Cultural crusades have been powered by anxiety rooted in economic and status tensions. Concern over economic and status questions is redirected to cultural quests where the chances of success seem greater. At work is an historical process that somehow displaced feelings of deep economic anxieties, which reappeared as cultural resentments. The "somehow" means we cannot explain how or why it happened other than to note that these occurrences from Roman times forward can best be seen as examples of the irrational and unconscious in history. What can be called psycho-cultural climates exist in history, as the great Lucien Febvre suggested, but the followers of Clio have made little progress in deciphering t hem. Intense stress and fear that one was losing control of ones destiny generates the emotional energy that drives these psycho-historical situations. Going back even farther than the Romans, we find examples of oppressed peoples becoming somehow "Gods’s elect." Arguably this occurred in the case of the ancient Jews. Historians have developed the formula "oppressed people, elect people." Elect, of course, meant chosen. In the modern American setting, the word "elect" is both an adjective and a verb.
The rise of the New Right had some of the characteristics of a half-political, half-religious revival. A psychohistorian would say that revivalism is sometimes "a symptom of incipient regression in a life of a community under conditions of stress." The revival need not always take a religious form, for example contemporary Rumania seems to be going through a period of great anxiety that is producing a revival of old songs, ballads, and dances, and interest in imaginary heroes of the past. In the contemporary American case, the religious revivals of the 19th Century are being reenacted in modern form and the laissez faire economics of the robber baron heroes are recast as the essentials of American tradition. Of course, the United States is very different from Romania. Yet both have entered periods when radical cultural reorganization, when the corporate spirit has declined and many have not quite figured out how to cope with the fre4edom and individualism that came with it. Some experience an intense need to belong which adherence to the New Right satisfies. ( In fourth century BCE Athens, a similar period of anxiety and transition occurred and many reacted by joining the new mystery cults while others embraced a greater degree of secularism.)
In the case of contemporary America, economic anxiety occurred after a period of great abundance and what seemed to be the promise of continued affluence– fulfillment of the American Dream. It occurred simultaneously with the emergence of postmodern culture, which brought in its wake ambiguity and contradiction in respect to values. A great majority of the same people experiencing economic anxiety were also troubled by new threats to their values. Perhaps some found the new mental freedom an invitation to inner anarchy, as Adorno noted half a century ago. In any event, they lacked the mental structures to address the cultural disorientation of the period and its potential threats in matters of conscience. Some probably found that their central cultural and religious beliefs were not as strong as they had though and that they craved a consistent and rigorous way of thinking. They were unprepared for a pluralistic culture and moral ambiguities. The crusade of the New Right seemed to resolve these inner conflicts and allowed them to cope with the anxieties of these times.
Economic stagnation and the breakdown of welfare capitalism in the United States disoriented millions of people, who sought answers and affirmation of their identities. One might expect them to drift into a political movement that clearly and directly addressed their situation. However, cultural arguments touch people more deeply, and they were to accept an ideology that somewhat tangentially offered them some economic relief. Economic historian Alexander Cershenkron noted that even nations with long democratic traditions can become democracies without democrats. It is not so difficult to have a generous view of fellow citizens when living standards are rising. Economic growth makes the expansion of democracy possible. When people's ecopnomic prospects are declining, it is so much easier to be less inclusive, less trusting, and more inclined to accept views that place blame on a nation's woes on others.
The 2004 US election provides clear evidence of the extent to which anxiety rooted in economic concerns was displaced to
cultural matters. Sixty one percent of white voters refused to support John Kerry. In 1991, Stanley Greenberg wrote that "unless thre are some limits to the [ Democratic] party's moral agnosticism," it will not win over the averagfe family.
In Europe, those who lost their jobs, faced great insecurity or had to accept less income and benefits are loosely called the "abandoned workers." In the United States, there is a very broad definition of middle class, and the New Right here is considered a middle class phenomenon. Among the recruits to
right-wing populism were many Reagan Democrats, who faced great economic insecurity but also believed their cultural and religious values were under assault.
What has emerged in the last thirty years, is a self-conscious status group in the United States, the members of which would not object to the descriptive term "Middle America." Over time, this vast status group became desperate and anxious, believing their social and economic positions were slipping or in danger of slipping.. These middle class Americans developed a sub-culture or collective consciousness made up of orientations that guide their actions, particularly at election time. These orientations represent a form of conservative populism. Invariably, conservative populists identified their own fates with that of the nation, which also faced very grave threats. They, like their nation, were virtuous and deserved primacy among other people and nations. Their opponents were not just somewhat wrong, they were "evil."
Max Weber argued that there is a strong need for psychic comfort or a feeling of established worthiness. He thought that class consciousness was essentially "psychological thoughts of men about their lives. " In this instance, we are not dealing with a class. Status groups also a very similar form of consciousness, and in the late Twentieth Century marketing and other techniques that make it possible to frame information and arguments in such a way as to shape the content of that consciousness. Weber believed the most compelling ideologies developed when a powerful set of ideas were taken up by the disadvantaged. That is why it was so important to persuade a vast slice of middle Americans, regardless of their economic status, that they are somehow disadvantaged.
Today, the party of the right-wing populists controls every branch of the national government state governments. Nevertheless, the anger of the right-wing populists has not abated because they believe that the media, press, universities, and entertainment are still dominated by liberals who are committed to destroying American culture. To some degree the belief that they are conspired against victims is a tonic and confers upon them special identities. They cannot congratulate themselves on their political success or the fact that the press largely has been intimidated into soft-pedalling or ignoring stories that would offend conservatives. Their radio and television shockmeisters continually remind them that they are not safe as long as there is a Hillary Clinton or Ted Kennedy in the Senate or as long as The New York Times or Washington Post remain in print.
Cultural crusades have been powered by anxiety rooted in economic and status tensions. Concern over economic and status questions is redirected to cultural quests where the chances of success seem greater. At work is an historical process that somehow displaced feelings of deep economic anxieties, which reappeared as cultural resentments. The "somehow" means we cannot explain how or why it happened other than to note that these occurrences from Roman times forward can best be seen as examples of the irrational and unconscious in history. What can be called psycho-cultural climates exist in history, as the great Lucien Febvre suggested, but the followers of Clio have made little progress in deciphering t hem. Intense stress and fear that one was losing control of ones destiny generates the emotional energy that drives these psycho-historical situations. Going back even farther than the Romans, we find examples of oppressed peoples becoming somehow "Gods’s elect." Arguably this occurred in the case of the ancient Jews. Historians have developed the formula "oppressed people, elect people." Elect, of course, meant chosen. In the modern American setting, the word "elect" is both an adjective and a verb.
The rise of the New Right had some of the characteristics of a half-political, half-religious revival. A psychohistorian would say that revivalism is sometimes "a symptom of incipient regression in a life of a community under conditions of stress." The revival need not always take a religious form, for example contemporary Rumania seems to be going through a period of great anxiety that is producing a revival of old songs, ballads, and dances, and interest in imaginary heroes of the past. In the contemporary American case, the religious revivals of the 19th Century are being reenacted in modern form and the laissez faire economics of the robber baron heroes are recast as the essentials of American tradition. Of course, the United States is very different from Romania. Yet both have entered periods when radical cultural reorganization, when the corporate spirit has declined and many have not quite figured out how to cope with the fre4edom and individualism that came with it. Some experience an intense need to belong which adherence to the New Right satisfies. ( In fourth century BCE Athens, a similar period of anxiety and transition occurred and many reacted by joining the new mystery cults while others embraced a greater degree of secularism.)
In the case of contemporary America, economic anxiety occurred after a period of great abundance and what seemed to be the promise of continued affluence– fulfillment of the American Dream. It occurred simultaneously with the emergence of postmodern culture, which brought in its wake ambiguity and contradiction in respect to values. A great majority of the same people experiencing economic anxiety were also troubled by new threats to their values. Perhaps some found the new mental freedom an invitation to inner anarchy, as Adorno noted half a century ago. In any event, they lacked the mental structures to address the cultural disorientation of the period and its potential threats in matters of conscience. Some probably found that their central cultural and religious beliefs were not as strong as they had though and that they craved a consistent and rigorous way of thinking. They were unprepared for a pluralistic culture and moral ambiguities. The crusade of the New Right seemed to resolve these inner conflicts and allowed them to cope with the anxieties of these times.
Sunday, April 17, 2005
RIGHT-WING POPULISM: THE GOP'S MOST POTENT WEAPON
After the 2004 defeat of John Kerry, many concluded that it was how one spoke about cultural issues that made the difference, and that George W. Bush’s appeal to conservative religious people explained what had happened. In fact, a more powerful and complex force was at work in establishing Republican dominance in the United States, right-wing populism as embodied in the New Right. At work was much more than many people responding to several hot button, values-laden issues. The Democrats were up against a complex, powerful social movement that took decades to build and a mind-set that will prove very difficult to change. True, the outlook of the Christian right lends itself to right-wing populism, but they are two different but closely related phenomena. Today’s incarnation of Right-wing populism is equated with evangelical religion, but it could stand alone as it frequently does in Europe. Right-wing populism is at the heart of the New Right’s identity and is largely a reaction against social change and comes wrapped as ultra-Americanism and assertive nationalism, which got a great boost from the terrible events of September 11, 2001.
Failing to fully understand what they were up against, some Democrats slightly toned down their support for all forms of abortion, and many of them acquired a book on cognitive linguistics that correctly showed that Republicans were very skilled at recasting unpopular policies in favorable langage and at "branding" Democrats as very undesirable political products. The reading will do them some good, but it is necessary for them to learn much more about right-wing populism.
The main elements of populism are celebrating "the people" and battling elites. American right-wing populists believe the country is dominated by an elitist coalition of big government bureaucrats, old money aristocrats, and the so-called "New Class" of academicians, intellectuals, media people, and technocrats. The belief that the elite looks down on other Americans gives right-wing populism its great force which is expressed in anger, resentment, and determination to go to the polls and strike a blow against their enemies. The elitists are accused of trying to destroy American culture, and the New Right sees a nation divided by two starkly different cultures, one good and one evil. The term "liberal" has been redefined to mean people who are trying to overturn traditional American culture by supporting moral relativism, permissiveness, softness on crime, pornography, abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia, and stem cell research. It is a simplistic black and white picture that bears little resemblance to reality but, with the help of a small army of propagandists, pundits and preachers, it has become the core frame of reference for the New Right. Growing belief that liberals are conspiring to undermine American culture and are contemptuous of ordinary Americans has generated paranoia and rage which has activated the New Right and enabled it to grow steadily as a political force over three decades. The fear and loathing of so-called elitists and their alleged plans to destroy American culture is far more important in motivating political action than particular issues like abortion or gay marriage.
American right-wing populism’s four main characteristics are majoritarianism– even in defiance of constitutional government, anti-elitism, intense nationalism, and anti-intellectualism. Historically, populism has led to anti-Semitism and racism. Polish writer Adam Michnik suggested that populism always contains an element of envy and employs demagoguery. When mixed with intense nationalism, it can produce fascism. However, it is likely that right populism would lose some of its charm in the United States if it were to spawn overt and excessive authoritarianism and obvious anti-Semitism or racism.
In the past, forms of populism in the United States have burned themselves out fairly quickly because they soon were manifesting more than a little bizarre and outrageous behavior. This latest incarnation has steadily grown over three decades, and zealous followers have been kept on somewhat acceptable paths by an army of radio talk show hosts, pundits, and very adept political managers. It has been no small accomplishment.
American right-wing populism it is very attractive to small entrepreneurs and ordinary Americans, often members of the white working class. In both Europe and America white males from the working class were particularly attracted to populism. They faced job insecurity and declining standards of living, and, especially in the United States, they resented the loss of privileges that had traditionally flowed from their status as white males. Yearning for the restoration of their roles as defenders and providers, some American men even joined militias, extremist organizations that display the repressive dimensions of right-wing populism when carried too far.
In the United States, however, right-wing populism appealed to an element that was not so important in Europe–evangelical, fundamentalist, and traditional Christianity. What has developed is, in the words of Italian writer Emilio Gentile defined "political religion, " defined as the use of religion , its language and symbols for political combat. The Christian adherents of the new right-wing populism have been called the Religious or Christian Right. Forty-two percent of American voters describe themselves as born-again, and about 75% of them have come to support the Republican party. In time the majority of traditionalist Catholics joined them on the religious right. It was unified by opposition to abortion, stem cell research, euthanasia, and homosexual practice. Some members of the Christian Right differ from non-religious right-wing populists in that they are interested in eroding the wall separating church and state, and they are even more opposed to an open society. A few on the Christian Right adhere to "dominionism," the belief that true Christians must acquire political power and lead the nation by carrying our their biblical principles.
The Christian Right took shape in the 1970, and were helped come into being by conservative operatives and strategists Paul Weyrich, Richard Viguerie, E.E. McAteer, and Howard Phillips. Their strategy proved to be so effective that one would expect it to have been hatched by several brilliant sociologists. In an 1976 interview, Viguerie said they were busy building support among evangelicals and getting "preachers into politics." They focused on ministers like Reverend Jerry Falwell, who believed America was being ruled by the "wicked." Christian Voice, an important evangelical group, was then saying that America was being attacked by "Satanist forces." This kind of black and white thinking did not invite dialogue, only fear, anger, and determination to seize power. By 2005, members of the Christian Right were announcing that those who opposed efforts to strip Democratic Senators of the right to filibuster against Republican judicial nominees were enemies of God. Republican Congressman Christopher Shays admitted that his party had been transformed into the "party of theocracy." Former Senator John Danforth, an Episcopal priest, observed that his party had been transformed "into the political arm of conservative Christians."
In most respects, there was a meshing of views and attitudes between the evangelicals and the right-wing populists. Even many members of the evangelical Churches, while usually voting for Republicans, were much more inclined to agree with their ministers on the evils of feminism or abortion than on other questions. Perhaps they were acting at the polls more as right-wing populists than as evangelicals, but certainly the appeals to the Religious Right helped activate their populism. Whether as evangelicals or as populists, they were equally disposed to demand that the United States take a more assertive role in world affairs, and they were frustrated when foreign countries failed to heed the leadership of this virtuous nation. Both were likely to see the Vietnam War a noble venture. For decades, this burning nationalism or what scholars call "foreign policy fundamentalism" bad been firmly suppressed by a bipartisan foreign policy establishment. With the election of George W. Bush, those favoring a far more aggressive and assertive foreign policy took power, and public outrage over the terrible events of September 11, 2001 made it possible for them to implement their policies. For some on the Christian Right, the invasion of Iraq was predicted in the Book of Revelation and should be seem as a large step toward the events of end times when one third of humankind is slain and millions of sinners are sent to eternal hellfire and torment.
It is unclear how far and how fast right-wing populism can continue to spread across a population. It is growing by leaps in bounds in Islamic countries, where conditions are more than ripe for its spread. Experience in the United States has demonstrated its steady growth, and the continual spread of evangelical Christianity seems to prepare its way for still more New Right growth. In the 1950s, people who held views similar to those of the New right were considered part of the so-called lunatic fringe. By the 1980s, there were many more of these people, but their views were not considered mainstream. Today, the New Right dominates the nation’s most powerful political party and has reason to claim that its outlook is becoming that of mainstream America.
Failing to fully understand what they were up against, some Democrats slightly toned down their support for all forms of abortion, and many of them acquired a book on cognitive linguistics that correctly showed that Republicans were very skilled at recasting unpopular policies in favorable langage and at "branding" Democrats as very undesirable political products. The reading will do them some good, but it is necessary for them to learn much more about right-wing populism.
The main elements of populism are celebrating "the people" and battling elites. American right-wing populists believe the country is dominated by an elitist coalition of big government bureaucrats, old money aristocrats, and the so-called "New Class" of academicians, intellectuals, media people, and technocrats. The belief that the elite looks down on other Americans gives right-wing populism its great force which is expressed in anger, resentment, and determination to go to the polls and strike a blow against their enemies. The elitists are accused of trying to destroy American culture, and the New Right sees a nation divided by two starkly different cultures, one good and one evil. The term "liberal" has been redefined to mean people who are trying to overturn traditional American culture by supporting moral relativism, permissiveness, softness on crime, pornography, abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia, and stem cell research. It is a simplistic black and white picture that bears little resemblance to reality but, with the help of a small army of propagandists, pundits and preachers, it has become the core frame of reference for the New Right. Growing belief that liberals are conspiring to undermine American culture and are contemptuous of ordinary Americans has generated paranoia and rage which has activated the New Right and enabled it to grow steadily as a political force over three decades. The fear and loathing of so-called elitists and their alleged plans to destroy American culture is far more important in motivating political action than particular issues like abortion or gay marriage.
American right-wing populism’s four main characteristics are majoritarianism– even in defiance of constitutional government, anti-elitism, intense nationalism, and anti-intellectualism. Historically, populism has led to anti-Semitism and racism. Polish writer Adam Michnik suggested that populism always contains an element of envy and employs demagoguery. When mixed with intense nationalism, it can produce fascism. However, it is likely that right populism would lose some of its charm in the United States if it were to spawn overt and excessive authoritarianism and obvious anti-Semitism or racism.
In the past, forms of populism in the United States have burned themselves out fairly quickly because they soon were manifesting more than a little bizarre and outrageous behavior. This latest incarnation has steadily grown over three decades, and zealous followers have been kept on somewhat acceptable paths by an army of radio talk show hosts, pundits, and very adept political managers. It has been no small accomplishment.
American right-wing populism it is very attractive to small entrepreneurs and ordinary Americans, often members of the white working class. In both Europe and America white males from the working class were particularly attracted to populism. They faced job insecurity and declining standards of living, and, especially in the United States, they resented the loss of privileges that had traditionally flowed from their status as white males. Yearning for the restoration of their roles as defenders and providers, some American men even joined militias, extremist organizations that display the repressive dimensions of right-wing populism when carried too far.
In the United States, however, right-wing populism appealed to an element that was not so important in Europe–evangelical, fundamentalist, and traditional Christianity. What has developed is, in the words of Italian writer Emilio Gentile defined "political religion, " defined as the use of religion , its language and symbols for political combat. The Christian adherents of the new right-wing populism have been called the Religious or Christian Right. Forty-two percent of American voters describe themselves as born-again, and about 75% of them have come to support the Republican party. In time the majority of traditionalist Catholics joined them on the religious right. It was unified by opposition to abortion, stem cell research, euthanasia, and homosexual practice. Some members of the Christian Right differ from non-religious right-wing populists in that they are interested in eroding the wall separating church and state, and they are even more opposed to an open society. A few on the Christian Right adhere to "dominionism," the belief that true Christians must acquire political power and lead the nation by carrying our their biblical principles.
The Christian Right took shape in the 1970, and were helped come into being by conservative operatives and strategists Paul Weyrich, Richard Viguerie, E.E. McAteer, and Howard Phillips. Their strategy proved to be so effective that one would expect it to have been hatched by several brilliant sociologists. In an 1976 interview, Viguerie said they were busy building support among evangelicals and getting "preachers into politics." They focused on ministers like Reverend Jerry Falwell, who believed America was being ruled by the "wicked." Christian Voice, an important evangelical group, was then saying that America was being attacked by "Satanist forces." This kind of black and white thinking did not invite dialogue, only fear, anger, and determination to seize power. By 2005, members of the Christian Right were announcing that those who opposed efforts to strip Democratic Senators of the right to filibuster against Republican judicial nominees were enemies of God. Republican Congressman Christopher Shays admitted that his party had been transformed into the "party of theocracy." Former Senator John Danforth, an Episcopal priest, observed that his party had been transformed "into the political arm of conservative Christians."
In most respects, there was a meshing of views and attitudes between the evangelicals and the right-wing populists. Even many members of the evangelical Churches, while usually voting for Republicans, were much more inclined to agree with their ministers on the evils of feminism or abortion than on other questions. Perhaps they were acting at the polls more as right-wing populists than as evangelicals, but certainly the appeals to the Religious Right helped activate their populism. Whether as evangelicals or as populists, they were equally disposed to demand that the United States take a more assertive role in world affairs, and they were frustrated when foreign countries failed to heed the leadership of this virtuous nation. Both were likely to see the Vietnam War a noble venture. For decades, this burning nationalism or what scholars call "foreign policy fundamentalism" bad been firmly suppressed by a bipartisan foreign policy establishment. With the election of George W. Bush, those favoring a far more aggressive and assertive foreign policy took power, and public outrage over the terrible events of September 11, 2001 made it possible for them to implement their policies. For some on the Christian Right, the invasion of Iraq was predicted in the Book of Revelation and should be seem as a large step toward the events of end times when one third of humankind is slain and millions of sinners are sent to eternal hellfire and torment.
It is unclear how far and how fast right-wing populism can continue to spread across a population. It is growing by leaps in bounds in Islamic countries, where conditions are more than ripe for its spread. Experience in the United States has demonstrated its steady growth, and the continual spread of evangelical Christianity seems to prepare its way for still more New Right growth. In the 1950s, people who held views similar to those of the New right were considered part of the so-called lunatic fringe. By the 1980s, there were many more of these people, but their views were not considered mainstream. Today, the New Right dominates the nation’s most powerful political party and has reason to claim that its outlook is becoming that of mainstream America.
Thursday, October 21, 2004
Abu Ghraib, the American Gulag, and Bush Policies
Several months ago, a Reserve sergeant was sentenced to eight years in prison for his part in the Abu Ghraib torture scandal. No one of higher rank has been charged; however, a Guard brigadier general was demoted on an old shoplifting charge and the inference that she should have had better control of Abu Ghraib. In truth, she had been ordered to turn over control to Military Intelligence, and she later made the mistake of going public with this information and practically predicting that she would be made a scapegoat. In late May, 2005, moderate columnist reported that over 100 detainees have died while in US custody, but this report caused only a few ripples in the US media. CBS, still in the dog house after it aired questionable documents about George Bush, ignored the matter entirely.
Although the Bush administration’s inflammatory pronouncements and “they hit us–we hit them” rhetoric was partly responsible, few make this connection. There has been little interest in tracing the scandal to its roots high up in the Bush government. Most Americans seem to hope the wrong-doing was confined to twenty or so low ranking personnel. Of course, the Bush administration is working hard to sell that illusion. If an officer is reprimanded in connection with the scandal, there is a caveat that says it will be removed from the personnel file in 6 months if the person is involved in no additional abuses.
In April, 2004, it was revealed that Iraqi detainees were being abused in Iraq by U.S. military police who were encouraged to do so by Military Intelligence and by civilian employees of private intelligence contractors, of which there were sixty in Iraq. In mid May, photographs surfaced of two soldiers posing with the dead body of a detainee who had apparently been beaten to death by CIA or private intelligence contractor operatives. The body was there because the CIA and military interrogators could not agree on who should dispose of it. When photographs of the abuse of Iraqi detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison became available in late April. 2004 , the Bush administration denied it had been hiding anything from the public and denied the extent of the abuse. Indeed it claimed that it had discovered the abuses and had been working to find the culprits. The Red Cross had been complaining about the abuses since October, 2003 and Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch had also expressed deep concern about the abuses. It later developed that there were numerous "ghost prisoners" who were hidden during Red Cross visits.
Human Rights First claims that Rumsefle order4ed the military to hide some detainees from the Red Cross. If this claim is true, the US is in violation of international law. It is claimed that some were held at another prison near Baghdad, at Kohat, Pakistan, LJ Jafr, Jordan and on Diego Garcia. It is strongly suspected that other detainees are held aboard warships, particularly the Navail Consolidated Brig in Charleston harbor.
The administration claimed abuses were isolated to a handful of wayward National Guard personnel. Yet some of the photographs revealed torture techniques known only skilled professionals. Questions were quickly raised about whether higher authorities were involved or, at the least, whether there was an outlook in the officer corps that made these abuses possible.
Soon after 9/11, President George W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Attorney General John Ashcroft agreed to a system of secretly detaining prisoners so that as much information could be extracted from them as possible. Rumsfeld even authorized "interrogation techniques" that involved nudity and use of dogs because the would challenge the religious sensibilities of detainees. After some months of interrogating prisoners, the Pentagon concluded that not enough information was being garnered. A study was ordered to explore the possibility of using torture. It concluded that the president could override laws forbidding torture and that those acting on his orders could not be prosecuted.
By April 16, 2003, General James Hill, who commanded overseas prisons, received guidance on new interrogation techniques. There were four that required the direct approval of the Secretary of Defense, and they were only employed on two prisoners. An August , 2002 Justice Department memo stated that torturing Al Qaeda prisoners might be justified and that the commander in chief’s full control of war policy could make international law provisions on torture unconstitutional. The memo from the Office of Legal Counsel was addressed to White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales and said that torturing Al Qaeda captives abroad “may be justified” and that international law on this subject “may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogation” of suspected terrorists. If questioning techniques brought on "organ failure" it could be considered torture. In June, 2004, Press Secretary Scott McClellan said Bush approved guidelines for interrogating prisoners but never endorsed specific techniques.
Meanwhile, a Defense Department task force, headed by Air Force Counsel Mary Walker under orders from Defense Department General Counsel William J. Haynes, III, was defining down what torture meant. Leaked memos from the Justice Department advised the task force that cruel psychological techniques might not constitute torture even if they went on for months or years. Likewise, physical abuse would equal torture only if it was “equivalent in intensity to pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily functions, or even death.”
Even though members of Congress could read parts of the memos in the newspapers, Attorney General John Ashcroft refused to turn his department’s correspondence on this over to the Senate. Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee also wrote a memorandum outlining what torture techniques could be used on senior al Qaeda members. After the Defense Department memo was issued, The Attorney General ruled that prisoners arrested in Afghanistan were “illegal enemy combatants,” who were not covered by the Geneva Conventions. Apparently Iraqi detainees were to technically enjoy coverage of the Geneva Convention. Perhaps the permissive attitudes about torture in the officer corps began here, even though the secret detention and interrogation program was originally designed to apply to only a relatively small number of people.
The Bush administration attempted to limit the damage by moving quickly to court-martial seven non-commissioned Guardsmen. Eventually the number of scape goats would expand to about two dozen low ranking soldiers. The administration drew a distinction between “abuse” and “torture.” Six officers were reprimanded, which immunized them from prosecution. Rumsfeld refused to use the word “torture” and would not go beyond saying that this sort of thing can happen when a system is not perfect. The government knew of the abuses much earlier and President Bush had been briefed during the winter holidays. By February, the Pentagon had a 53 page report written by Major General Antonio M. Taguba, but it had not been read by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the time the story broke. Taguba discovered “systematic” abuse, but when he testified before Congress he moved toward the official story.
Yet, three weeks before the story broke Joint Chiefs Chairman Richard Myers had asked Dan Rather to delay releasing the story. Secretary Rumsfeld said he had read only a summary and had not been briefed on its contents.. The report indicated that one private security contracting company called CACI was clearly instructing MPs to abuse prisoners. Republican pundit Bill O ’Reilly expressed anger that the photographs of the humiliated Iraqis was shown on television, claiming this could cost American lives. Before Taguba was sent to study the situation, Major General Geoffrey Miller, who commanded the Guantanamo detention center, was sent in September, 2003, to study the situation a Abu Ghraib. If fact, his mission was to bring Gitmo techniques to Iraq and to place most of Abu Gharib under the jurisdiction of Military Intelligence.
Since April, 2003 interrogation techniques at Guantanamo had been toughened on the orders of the Pentagon. He "recommended" that the Military Intelligence be placed in charge of the prison and that prisoners could be placed in stress positions, deprived of sleep, and exposed to extremes of heat and cold. He wanted to “Gitmoize” the prison. The prison was placed under the control of military intelligence and civilian intelligence operatives on November 19.
Whether Miller recommended more severe measures is not known. At some time, most probably later, he was briefed –“read in”- about an operation called “Copper Green” which Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice had approved after 9/11. This was most probably the program Bush and Ashcroft admit to having endorsed. It was designed to extract information from “high value” prisoners. It was a “black” special-access program (SAP) that authorized elite personnel from the CIA, Seals, and other agencies to “Grab whom you must. Do what you want.” These high value terrorists could be moved across borders and kept in various locations in a vast US interrogation network. This secret gulag or network of prisons was linked largely by CIA operated Gulfstream and other executive jets . Prisoners were also turned over to other regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Pakistan for torture and interrogation. One Canadian citizen was held in Syria for three months, a matter that caused great consternation in Canada.
In the mid- 1990s, the Clinton administration began sanction the transportation of terrorist detainees to foreign countries for questioning. This policy of “rendition” was limited to people who had already been found guilty in our courts. The Bush administration broadened this policy to include mere suspects, and about one hundred and fifty have been subjected to rendition since 2001. The new policy was part of what Alberto Gonzales called the New Paradigm, the administration’s new approach to detention and interrogation. Rendition also changed in that it often meant more than just sending detainees to foreign countries, they were often held and questioned by Americans in safehouses in those countries. Detainees were sent to other countries known for the use of brutal torture techniques. Some have estimated that as many as 9,000 people were held in facilities that very from small rooms to very large encampments. However, it is doubtful that anything approaching that number are subjected to treatment that completely exceed international conventions. The New York Bar Association's estimation of 150 probably is about right for the people handed over to foreign governments for intense questioning.
It is now known that the abuse of prisoners at Bagram, Gardez, and Kandahar in Afghanistan was extensive. In May, 2005, the New York Times published a story based on a 2000 page report on systematic abuse of prisoners at Afghanistan's Bagram Collection Point. The most herart-breaking story was about a shy, illiterate young cab driver who was bound by wire to the ceiling of his cell for days while captors repeatedly struck and mocked him. He repeatedly called "Allah," which provoked laughter and jeers. Eventually the flesh around the bottom of his legs had, according to the coroner, been "pulpified." By the time he died, most of his American interrogators had decided he was innocent.
A minimum of eight detainees in Afghanistan died in US captivity, but the military claims that only two were homocides. Afghan investigators reported that prisoners were given electric shocks, beaten, hung upside down, had their toenails ripped out, and immersed in cold water. Hussain Youssouf Mustafa, a Pakistani sent to Bagram for questioning, said soldiers forced him to bend down so a one of them could ram a stick up his rectum. Another detainee, Abdurahaim Khadr, told a Canadian court that US soldiers "got me naked and they were taking pictures of my face and my private parts--just constantly taking pictures of my private parts." The commandos operating under this program seized people in Afghanistan and placed them in “the Pit” and other detention centers, where they were subjected to various forms of abuse, including sexual. They had learned that sex, especially homosexual sex, was especially taboo among Muslims. It was thought that sexual degradation and photographing people in compromising sexual situations would produce information and even recruit prisoners to become informers.
Vice President Cheney personally managed the administration’s successful Abu Ghraib damage control program. It was also Cheney who spearheaded the effort to conflate the Iraq operation with the war on terror by suggesting that Iraq had something to do with 9/11. For many, this cloaked the torture in the prisons with the mantle of righteous retribution.
Few voters would learn very much about how extensive the torture was or that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was involved in a secret program to allow torture and circumvent the Geneva Conventions. When the Sacramento Bee first ran stories about the prison abuse, there seemed to be hardly a ripple of public concern. As soon as it published a photograph, there were many complaints about “pornography,” “Sensationalism,” and “ bush-bashing” Only a handful of readers commended the paper for printing the photograph. Senator James M. Inhofe of Oklahoma spoke for many Americans when he admitted he was “more outraged by the outrage than we are by the treatment.” It was likely that conservative voters in the Midwest were more outraged by the sexual debauchery than the torture of Iraqis and that there was a widespread sentiment that such mistreatment was to be expected in wartime. The Pentagon refused to release more photographs, claiming they were evidence in a continuing investigation.
Some noted that the torture was “a direct consequence of the with-us-or-against-us doctrines of world struggle “ of the Bush administration, but appeared that most of the press wanted to move on to other subjects. Concern was voiced that following the story showed “bad taste” or was “political,” meaning it would reflect badly on the Bush administration. The torture story soon was cycled to the back pages in most places and the press did not show a great deal of interest in getting far beyond the cover story that the mistreatment was the work of seven guardsmen. However, a few of the nation’s best papers continued to follow the story, track memos that suggested a shift in policy about torture began at the highest reaches of government.
last revised- July 6, 2005
Although the Bush administration’s inflammatory pronouncements and “they hit us–we hit them” rhetoric was partly responsible, few make this connection. There has been little interest in tracing the scandal to its roots high up in the Bush government. Most Americans seem to hope the wrong-doing was confined to twenty or so low ranking personnel. Of course, the Bush administration is working hard to sell that illusion. If an officer is reprimanded in connection with the scandal, there is a caveat that says it will be removed from the personnel file in 6 months if the person is involved in no additional abuses.
In April, 2004, it was revealed that Iraqi detainees were being abused in Iraq by U.S. military police who were encouraged to do so by Military Intelligence and by civilian employees of private intelligence contractors, of which there were sixty in Iraq. In mid May, photographs surfaced of two soldiers posing with the dead body of a detainee who had apparently been beaten to death by CIA or private intelligence contractor operatives. The body was there because the CIA and military interrogators could not agree on who should dispose of it. When photographs of the abuse of Iraqi detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison became available in late April. 2004 , the Bush administration denied it had been hiding anything from the public and denied the extent of the abuse. Indeed it claimed that it had discovered the abuses and had been working to find the culprits. The Red Cross had been complaining about the abuses since October, 2003 and Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch had also expressed deep concern about the abuses. It later developed that there were numerous "ghost prisoners" who were hidden during Red Cross visits.
Human Rights First claims that Rumsefle order4ed the military to hide some detainees from the Red Cross. If this claim is true, the US is in violation of international law. It is claimed that some were held at another prison near Baghdad, at Kohat, Pakistan, LJ Jafr, Jordan and on Diego Garcia. It is strongly suspected that other detainees are held aboard warships, particularly the Navail Consolidated Brig in Charleston harbor.
The administration claimed abuses were isolated to a handful of wayward National Guard personnel. Yet some of the photographs revealed torture techniques known only skilled professionals. Questions were quickly raised about whether higher authorities were involved or, at the least, whether there was an outlook in the officer corps that made these abuses possible.
Soon after 9/11, President George W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Attorney General John Ashcroft agreed to a system of secretly detaining prisoners so that as much information could be extracted from them as possible. Rumsfeld even authorized "interrogation techniques" that involved nudity and use of dogs because the would challenge the religious sensibilities of detainees. After some months of interrogating prisoners, the Pentagon concluded that not enough information was being garnered. A study was ordered to explore the possibility of using torture. It concluded that the president could override laws forbidding torture and that those acting on his orders could not be prosecuted.
By April 16, 2003, General James Hill, who commanded overseas prisons, received guidance on new interrogation techniques. There were four that required the direct approval of the Secretary of Defense, and they were only employed on two prisoners. An August , 2002 Justice Department memo stated that torturing Al Qaeda prisoners might be justified and that the commander in chief’s full control of war policy could make international law provisions on torture unconstitutional. The memo from the Office of Legal Counsel was addressed to White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales and said that torturing Al Qaeda captives abroad “may be justified” and that international law on this subject “may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogation” of suspected terrorists. If questioning techniques brought on "organ failure" it could be considered torture. In June, 2004, Press Secretary Scott McClellan said Bush approved guidelines for interrogating prisoners but never endorsed specific techniques.
Meanwhile, a Defense Department task force, headed by Air Force Counsel Mary Walker under orders from Defense Department General Counsel William J. Haynes, III, was defining down what torture meant. Leaked memos from the Justice Department advised the task force that cruel psychological techniques might not constitute torture even if they went on for months or years. Likewise, physical abuse would equal torture only if it was “equivalent in intensity to pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily functions, or even death.”
Even though members of Congress could read parts of the memos in the newspapers, Attorney General John Ashcroft refused to turn his department’s correspondence on this over to the Senate. Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee also wrote a memorandum outlining what torture techniques could be used on senior al Qaeda members. After the Defense Department memo was issued, The Attorney General ruled that prisoners arrested in Afghanistan were “illegal enemy combatants,” who were not covered by the Geneva Conventions. Apparently Iraqi detainees were to technically enjoy coverage of the Geneva Convention. Perhaps the permissive attitudes about torture in the officer corps began here, even though the secret detention and interrogation program was originally designed to apply to only a relatively small number of people.
The Bush administration attempted to limit the damage by moving quickly to court-martial seven non-commissioned Guardsmen. Eventually the number of scape goats would expand to about two dozen low ranking soldiers. The administration drew a distinction between “abuse” and “torture.” Six officers were reprimanded, which immunized them from prosecution. Rumsfeld refused to use the word “torture” and would not go beyond saying that this sort of thing can happen when a system is not perfect. The government knew of the abuses much earlier and President Bush had been briefed during the winter holidays. By February, the Pentagon had a 53 page report written by Major General Antonio M. Taguba, but it had not been read by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the time the story broke. Taguba discovered “systematic” abuse, but when he testified before Congress he moved toward the official story.
Yet, three weeks before the story broke Joint Chiefs Chairman Richard Myers had asked Dan Rather to delay releasing the story. Secretary Rumsfeld said he had read only a summary and had not been briefed on its contents.. The report indicated that one private security contracting company called CACI was clearly instructing MPs to abuse prisoners. Republican pundit Bill O ’Reilly expressed anger that the photographs of the humiliated Iraqis was shown on television, claiming this could cost American lives. Before Taguba was sent to study the situation, Major General Geoffrey Miller, who commanded the Guantanamo detention center, was sent in September, 2003, to study the situation a Abu Ghraib. If fact, his mission was to bring Gitmo techniques to Iraq and to place most of Abu Gharib under the jurisdiction of Military Intelligence.
Since April, 2003 interrogation techniques at Guantanamo had been toughened on the orders of the Pentagon. He "recommended" that the Military Intelligence be placed in charge of the prison and that prisoners could be placed in stress positions, deprived of sleep, and exposed to extremes of heat and cold. He wanted to “Gitmoize” the prison. The prison was placed under the control of military intelligence and civilian intelligence operatives on November 19.
Whether Miller recommended more severe measures is not known. At some time, most probably later, he was briefed –“read in”- about an operation called “Copper Green” which Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice had approved after 9/11. This was most probably the program Bush and Ashcroft admit to having endorsed. It was designed to extract information from “high value” prisoners. It was a “black” special-access program (SAP) that authorized elite personnel from the CIA, Seals, and other agencies to “Grab whom you must. Do what you want.” These high value terrorists could be moved across borders and kept in various locations in a vast US interrogation network. This secret gulag or network of prisons was linked largely by CIA operated Gulfstream and other executive jets . Prisoners were also turned over to other regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Pakistan for torture and interrogation. One Canadian citizen was held in Syria for three months, a matter that caused great consternation in Canada.
In the mid- 1990s, the Clinton administration began sanction the transportation of terrorist detainees to foreign countries for questioning. This policy of “rendition” was limited to people who had already been found guilty in our courts. The Bush administration broadened this policy to include mere suspects, and about one hundred and fifty have been subjected to rendition since 2001. The new policy was part of what Alberto Gonzales called the New Paradigm, the administration’s new approach to detention and interrogation. Rendition also changed in that it often meant more than just sending detainees to foreign countries, they were often held and questioned by Americans in safehouses in those countries. Detainees were sent to other countries known for the use of brutal torture techniques. Some have estimated that as many as 9,000 people were held in facilities that very from small rooms to very large encampments. However, it is doubtful that anything approaching that number are subjected to treatment that completely exceed international conventions. The New York Bar Association's estimation of 150 probably is about right for the people handed over to foreign governments for intense questioning.
It is now known that the abuse of prisoners at Bagram, Gardez, and Kandahar in Afghanistan was extensive. In May, 2005, the New York Times published a story based on a 2000 page report on systematic abuse of prisoners at Afghanistan's Bagram Collection Point. The most herart-breaking story was about a shy, illiterate young cab driver who was bound by wire to the ceiling of his cell for days while captors repeatedly struck and mocked him. He repeatedly called "Allah," which provoked laughter and jeers. Eventually the flesh around the bottom of his legs had, according to the coroner, been "pulpified." By the time he died, most of his American interrogators had decided he was innocent.
A minimum of eight detainees in Afghanistan died in US captivity, but the military claims that only two were homocides. Afghan investigators reported that prisoners were given electric shocks, beaten, hung upside down, had their toenails ripped out, and immersed in cold water. Hussain Youssouf Mustafa, a Pakistani sent to Bagram for questioning, said soldiers forced him to bend down so a one of them could ram a stick up his rectum. Another detainee, Abdurahaim Khadr, told a Canadian court that US soldiers "got me naked and they were taking pictures of my face and my private parts--just constantly taking pictures of my private parts." The commandos operating under this program seized people in Afghanistan and placed them in “the Pit” and other detention centers, where they were subjected to various forms of abuse, including sexual. They had learned that sex, especially homosexual sex, was especially taboo among Muslims. It was thought that sexual degradation and photographing people in compromising sexual situations would produce information and even recruit prisoners to become informers.
Vice President Cheney personally managed the administration’s successful Abu Ghraib damage control program. It was also Cheney who spearheaded the effort to conflate the Iraq operation with the war on terror by suggesting that Iraq had something to do with 9/11. For many, this cloaked the torture in the prisons with the mantle of righteous retribution.
Few voters would learn very much about how extensive the torture was or that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was involved in a secret program to allow torture and circumvent the Geneva Conventions. When the Sacramento Bee first ran stories about the prison abuse, there seemed to be hardly a ripple of public concern. As soon as it published a photograph, there were many complaints about “pornography,” “Sensationalism,” and “ bush-bashing” Only a handful of readers commended the paper for printing the photograph. Senator James M. Inhofe of Oklahoma spoke for many Americans when he admitted he was “more outraged by the outrage than we are by the treatment.” It was likely that conservative voters in the Midwest were more outraged by the sexual debauchery than the torture of Iraqis and that there was a widespread sentiment that such mistreatment was to be expected in wartime. The Pentagon refused to release more photographs, claiming they were evidence in a continuing investigation.
Some noted that the torture was “a direct consequence of the with-us-or-against-us doctrines of world struggle “ of the Bush administration, but appeared that most of the press wanted to move on to other subjects. Concern was voiced that following the story showed “bad taste” or was “political,” meaning it would reflect badly on the Bush administration. The torture story soon was cycled to the back pages in most places and the press did not show a great deal of interest in getting far beyond the cover story that the mistreatment was the work of seven guardsmen. However, a few of the nation’s best papers continued to follow the story, track memos that suggested a shift in policy about torture began at the highest reaches of government.
last revised- July 6, 2005
Wednesday, October 20, 2004
Who can Believe Condi?: The Bush Administration Put Counterterrorism on the Back Burner Bfore 9/11
It is appropriate that Condi is on the road defending the Bush record on terrorism. The trouble is she has bent the truth so many times, she cannot be believed. When she assumed her new position, she and George W. Bush put counterterrorism on the back burner. Later, she did all she could to avoid admitting this.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, had written that terrorism was manly part of the problem of dealing with rogue states, suggesting that she did not understand how dangerous Al Qaeda had become. She believed the new administration should deal with a few major foreign policy problems and attend to the less important later. She shared the belief of the Bush team that Clinton foreign policy had been wrong pretty much across the board and was determined pursue different approaches.1 Before leaving office, the Clinton National Security staff had three meetings with Bush counterparts. Clinton’s National Security Advisor Sandy Berger attended one of those meetings himself because he wanted to underscore the warning he was there to give about Al Qaeda. Berger told Dr. Condoleezza Rice, his successor, that her main problem would he terrorism. Berger told her in a private meeting, "I believe that the Bush Administration will spend more time on terrorism generally, and on Al-Qaeda specifically, than on any other subject." To emphasize the subjects importance, Berger held a special briefing on the subject. Richard Clarke, who had also worked for the first Bush administration, made the presentation via PowerPoint. Clarke outlined an action plan that included assisting the fight against terrorism in the Philippines, Yemen, and Uzbekistan. It also included more aid for the Northern Alliance foes of the Taliban, far greater covert action there, the use of special operations forces, air strikes, and the freezing of financial assets. Rice later denied that Berger was present, and another Bush official minimized the meetings importance, claiming that it was only a PowerPoint presentation. Under Clinton, Clarke had the de facto standing of a cabinet officer where counter terrorism was involved. Brian Sheridan, a Clinton assistant secretary of defense , repeated Berger’s warning in a meeting with Rice and urged her to keep Richard Clarke and rely upon his expertise. Sheridan offered to brief her team on what he knew about terrorism and counter terrorism, but no one asked to hear what he had to say. Clarke did brief Rice on Al Qaeda, and "her facial expression gave {him} the impression that she had never heard the term before" or was not very concerned about it. Rice retained Clarke, was not sure a separate directorate for counterterrorism was need, and reorganized the NSC in a way that diminished Clarke’s influence. He no longer had a seat at the Principals Committee when terrorism was discussed, bur Rice did ask him to lead an interagency study of U.S. efforts to deal with Al Qaeda. Before being removed from that venue, Clarke argued that there was an urgent need to address the Al Qaeda question at the January Principal’s Meeting and warned that "We would make a major error if we underestimated the challenge al-Qaeda poses or overestimating the stability of the moderate, friendly regimes Al-Qaeda threatens." The question of what to do about terrorism was turned over to Vice President Dick Cheney for study.
Lieutenant General Donald Kerrick, a holdover from the Clinton NSC staff, wrote a paper for Dr. Rice warning that the terrorists will strike again. He believed that the memo resulted in his being excluded from meetings where he could raise the matter. The general feared that the Bush team were thinking like predecessors in the eighties, that terrorism was mainly a problem associated with rogue states. In his view, the Rice NSC demoted terrorism as a priority concern. General Hugh Shelton saw anti-terrorism moving "farther to the back burner." It is also known that a 1999 government study indicated that Al Qaeda might dispatch "suicide bombers ... [to]crash an aircraft ...into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the White House."
Dr. Rice subjected the Clinton NSC plan to an eight-month "policy review." Since the Spring, Clarke had warned Rice about Al Qaeda and once even said the organization was "trying to kill Americans, to have hundreds pf dead in the streets of America." The Clarke plan was not reviewed by Cheney, Wolfowitz, Powell, and George Tenet until September 4, 2002, when most of its provisions were finally accepted. Wolfowitz raised a strong objection to Clarke comparing Bin Laden to Adolf Hitler and said "Well, I just don’t understand why we are beginning by talking abnout this one man bin Laden." Wolfowitz was much more interested in looking into I raqi terrorism. Rumsfeld seemed impatient with the discussion of Al Qaeda and supported Wolfowitz in wanting to turn to other sources of terrorism, particularly Iraq. Rice’s deputy suggested they needed a policy of Al Qaeda’s sanctuary state, Afghanistan, before a great deal could be done about Al Qaeda. The Clinton proto-plan was more surgical in nature than the action eventually taken by the Bush administration after the attack on 9-11. The latter plan had the advantage of possibly bringing enough stability to permit construction of a planned twin pipeline to take Caspian fuels through Afghanistan into Pakistan and India.. 2
In its last years, the Clinton administration assigned a high priority to counterterrorism. The president received detailed information on Al Qaeda and terrorism. George W. Bush was told by a counterterrorism expert during the campaign that Americans would die during his first term due to a terrorist strike. At their December 19, 2000 meeting, Bill Clinton told President-elect Bush , "I think you will find that by far your biggest threat is bin Laden and the al-Qaeda." There is no evidence Bush heeded the warning. At 40 morning meetings with the president, George Tenet warned about the great threat posed by Al Qaeda. The 9/11 commission was unable to turn up evidence that Bush discussed terrorism more than once prior to September 11. It did learn that more than 40 reports sent to Bush indicated that Al Qaeda was a very serious threat. Moderate Democratic vice-chairman made it clear the body was "not interested in trying to assess blame...." To counterbalance information damaging to Bush, it criticized Clinton for failure to act decisively against Bin Laden’s organization even though an exploitable opportunity to do so did not exist. The commission faced insuperable obstacles for assessing responsibility –a matter it essentially whitewashed--and settled for mainly looking at what could be done to prevent another attack. The administration repeatedly delayed turning over information, prompting member Max Cleland to observe, "It’s obvious that the White House wants to run out the clock here...." Before 9/11, George W. Bush did not make counterterrorism a major priority and he has almost admitted as much. Available evidence suggests that the Bush administration’s counter terrorism program was unfocussed and received a low priority. 3 Before September 11, 2001 the principal’s committee of the Bush NSC only met twice to consider the terrorist threat. Yet, it had met at least 90 times. On the other hand, the Clinton NSC principals group dealt regularly with counter terrorism and it had a Counterterrorism Security Group that met two or three times a week since 1998. The Clinton efforts to improve the Predator drone were subsequently hobbled by a turf battle between the FBI and CIA and disagreement about who would put out the $200,000 to replace future drones lost in surveillance missions.. There is evidence that Clinton’s more aggressive efforts to hunt down or neutralize Bin Laden were shelved. 4 It is know that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld cancelled the budget for Clinton’s program for hunting down and exterminating Osama bin Laden. The secretary also rejected a request to pour $800 million into anti-terrorist activities. John Ashcroft turned down a request to hire hundreds of new FBI agents to fight terrorism. While asking for greater appropriations for 68 Justice Department programs, he did not request more money to fight terrorism. Clinton’s NSA counter-terrorism chief Richard Clarke and CIA director George Tenet, a Clinton appointee, were unsuccessfully trying to direct more attention to the problem in the months before the attack. 5 In a July 5 White House Situation Room meeting, Clarke told representatives of other agencies that "something really spectacular is going to happen here, and it’s going to happen soon."6 It is known that eleven countries provided advanced warning that a major attack was imminent, and two senior Mossad officers appeared in Washington in August with information that there were 200 terrorists resident in the U.S. preparing the attack. They gave the FBI and CIA the names of four of the hijackers.7
Eventually, Congressional investigators were tipped off that President Bush had been warned that Al Qaeda planned to strike the US. Attention came to focus on the president’s August 6 daily briefing, which carried the headline: " Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.," There is no evidence Bush even read the memo. It was presented to him on his first day of his month-long vacation at his Crawford ranch. If he did read it, it may have had little impact upon him as he went off that morning on a fishing expedition. 8 The administration refused to reveal exactly what information it contained or to expand upon what else President Bush may have been told about bin Laden’s intentions and capabilities. Condoleezza Rice stated on May 16, 2002 that Presidential Daily Briefing (PDP) dealt with an historical perspective on Bin Laden’s historical method of operation. She included among those methods hijacking airliners but added that "I don’t think anybody could have predicted that these people would take an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center…." Other administration officials echoed her assertion that no one had thought about the possibility of using airplanes as weapons to crash into buildings. Rice and others also said that while there were warnings about Al Qaeda attacks, they were about assaults on U.S. assets or planes abroad. In truth, this possibility had been discussed in intelligvence circles for several years, and the FBI had been warning about this porspect in the weeks before 9/11.
The evidence that has become public suggests that Dr. Rice and other figures in the Bush administration were telling less than the truth about what was known. If they did not know of the strong possibility that terrorists were likely to attempt to fly airplanes into buildings in the United States it is because they were not doing their homework or because the administration had placed counter terrorism on the back burner. A 1993 Pentagon study raised the possibility that an airplane could be used as a bomb to a national landmark. There were four known efforts to fly airplanes into buildings in 1994, one was by an Al Qaeda related group that tried to send a plane into the Eiffrel Tower. A massive plan , called Project Bojinka,"was unearthed in the Philippines which included an option for flying planes into "key structures" in the United States. Among them were the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the Sears Tower, the White House, and the Transamerica Tower. One of the captured pilots had been trained in the U.S. and said he was to fly into the CIA headquarters. In his 1995 World Trade Center bombing trial, Ramsi Youse talked about flying a plane into the CIA headquarters, and he had earlier mentioned to FBI agents the possibility of doing this to the Pentagon. CIA agents reported in August , 1998 that terrorists were planning to capture a plane in a foreign country and fly into the World Trade Center. In 1999, the National Security Council learned, based on information gathered from a Pakistani arrested in the Philippines that "suicide bomber [s] belonging to al-Qaeda’s Martyrdom Battalion could crash land an aircraft packed with high explosives ( c-4 and semtex) into the Pentagon, (CIA), or the White House. There were other intelligence reports of plans to fly bomb-laden planes into various targets the Egyptian Presidential Palace and U.S. airports. Vladimir Putin had warned in August the US that 25 Islamic terrorists were in the US on a major mission, and that number included suicide pilots who were to attack U.S. targets. Jordan accurately provided the name of the Al Qaeda mission to attack U.S. targets, "Big Wedding." Israel warned in mid-August that 50 to 200 Al Qaeda terroists were in the U.S. and gave the CIA a list 19 terrorists who were to be involved in the initial attack. It is known that four of the names were accurate, but the full list was never released.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, had written that terrorism was manly part of the problem of dealing with rogue states, suggesting that she did not understand how dangerous Al Qaeda had become. She believed the new administration should deal with a few major foreign policy problems and attend to the less important later. She shared the belief of the Bush team that Clinton foreign policy had been wrong pretty much across the board and was determined pursue different approaches.1 Before leaving office, the Clinton National Security staff had three meetings with Bush counterparts. Clinton’s National Security Advisor Sandy Berger attended one of those meetings himself because he wanted to underscore the warning he was there to give about Al Qaeda. Berger told Dr. Condoleezza Rice, his successor, that her main problem would he terrorism. Berger told her in a private meeting, "I believe that the Bush Administration will spend more time on terrorism generally, and on Al-Qaeda specifically, than on any other subject." To emphasize the subjects importance, Berger held a special briefing on the subject. Richard Clarke, who had also worked for the first Bush administration, made the presentation via PowerPoint. Clarke outlined an action plan that included assisting the fight against terrorism in the Philippines, Yemen, and Uzbekistan. It also included more aid for the Northern Alliance foes of the Taliban, far greater covert action there, the use of special operations forces, air strikes, and the freezing of financial assets. Rice later denied that Berger was present, and another Bush official minimized the meetings importance, claiming that it was only a PowerPoint presentation. Under Clinton, Clarke had the de facto standing of a cabinet officer where counter terrorism was involved. Brian Sheridan, a Clinton assistant secretary of defense , repeated Berger’s warning in a meeting with Rice and urged her to keep Richard Clarke and rely upon his expertise. Sheridan offered to brief her team on what he knew about terrorism and counter terrorism, but no one asked to hear what he had to say. Clarke did brief Rice on Al Qaeda, and "her facial expression gave {him} the impression that she had never heard the term before" or was not very concerned about it. Rice retained Clarke, was not sure a separate directorate for counterterrorism was need, and reorganized the NSC in a way that diminished Clarke’s influence. He no longer had a seat at the Principals Committee when terrorism was discussed, bur Rice did ask him to lead an interagency study of U.S. efforts to deal with Al Qaeda. Before being removed from that venue, Clarke argued that there was an urgent need to address the Al Qaeda question at the January Principal’s Meeting and warned that "We would make a major error if we underestimated the challenge al-Qaeda poses or overestimating the stability of the moderate, friendly regimes Al-Qaeda threatens." The question of what to do about terrorism was turned over to Vice President Dick Cheney for study.
Lieutenant General Donald Kerrick, a holdover from the Clinton NSC staff, wrote a paper for Dr. Rice warning that the terrorists will strike again. He believed that the memo resulted in his being excluded from meetings where he could raise the matter. The general feared that the Bush team were thinking like predecessors in the eighties, that terrorism was mainly a problem associated with rogue states. In his view, the Rice NSC demoted terrorism as a priority concern. General Hugh Shelton saw anti-terrorism moving "farther to the back burner." It is also known that a 1999 government study indicated that Al Qaeda might dispatch "suicide bombers ... [to]crash an aircraft ...into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the White House."
Dr. Rice subjected the Clinton NSC plan to an eight-month "policy review." Since the Spring, Clarke had warned Rice about Al Qaeda and once even said the organization was "trying to kill Americans, to have hundreds pf dead in the streets of America." The Clarke plan was not reviewed by Cheney, Wolfowitz, Powell, and George Tenet until September 4, 2002, when most of its provisions were finally accepted. Wolfowitz raised a strong objection to Clarke comparing Bin Laden to Adolf Hitler and said "Well, I just don’t understand why we are beginning by talking abnout this one man bin Laden." Wolfowitz was much more interested in looking into I raqi terrorism. Rumsfeld seemed impatient with the discussion of Al Qaeda and supported Wolfowitz in wanting to turn to other sources of terrorism, particularly Iraq. Rice’s deputy suggested they needed a policy of Al Qaeda’s sanctuary state, Afghanistan, before a great deal could be done about Al Qaeda. The Clinton proto-plan was more surgical in nature than the action eventually taken by the Bush administration after the attack on 9-11. The latter plan had the advantage of possibly bringing enough stability to permit construction of a planned twin pipeline to take Caspian fuels through Afghanistan into Pakistan and India.. 2
In its last years, the Clinton administration assigned a high priority to counterterrorism. The president received detailed information on Al Qaeda and terrorism. George W. Bush was told by a counterterrorism expert during the campaign that Americans would die during his first term due to a terrorist strike. At their December 19, 2000 meeting, Bill Clinton told President-elect Bush , "I think you will find that by far your biggest threat is bin Laden and the al-Qaeda." There is no evidence Bush heeded the warning. At 40 morning meetings with the president, George Tenet warned about the great threat posed by Al Qaeda. The 9/11 commission was unable to turn up evidence that Bush discussed terrorism more than once prior to September 11. It did learn that more than 40 reports sent to Bush indicated that Al Qaeda was a very serious threat. Moderate Democratic vice-chairman made it clear the body was "not interested in trying to assess blame...." To counterbalance information damaging to Bush, it criticized Clinton for failure to act decisively against Bin Laden’s organization even though an exploitable opportunity to do so did not exist. The commission faced insuperable obstacles for assessing responsibility –a matter it essentially whitewashed--and settled for mainly looking at what could be done to prevent another attack. The administration repeatedly delayed turning over information, prompting member Max Cleland to observe, "It’s obvious that the White House wants to run out the clock here...." Before 9/11, George W. Bush did not make counterterrorism a major priority and he has almost admitted as much. Available evidence suggests that the Bush administration’s counter terrorism program was unfocussed and received a low priority. 3 Before September 11, 2001 the principal’s committee of the Bush NSC only met twice to consider the terrorist threat. Yet, it had met at least 90 times. On the other hand, the Clinton NSC principals group dealt regularly with counter terrorism and it had a Counterterrorism Security Group that met two or three times a week since 1998. The Clinton efforts to improve the Predator drone were subsequently hobbled by a turf battle between the FBI and CIA and disagreement about who would put out the $200,000 to replace future drones lost in surveillance missions.. There is evidence that Clinton’s more aggressive efforts to hunt down or neutralize Bin Laden were shelved. 4 It is know that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld cancelled the budget for Clinton’s program for hunting down and exterminating Osama bin Laden. The secretary also rejected a request to pour $800 million into anti-terrorist activities. John Ashcroft turned down a request to hire hundreds of new FBI agents to fight terrorism. While asking for greater appropriations for 68 Justice Department programs, he did not request more money to fight terrorism. Clinton’s NSA counter-terrorism chief Richard Clarke and CIA director George Tenet, a Clinton appointee, were unsuccessfully trying to direct more attention to the problem in the months before the attack. 5 In a July 5 White House Situation Room meeting, Clarke told representatives of other agencies that "something really spectacular is going to happen here, and it’s going to happen soon."6 It is known that eleven countries provided advanced warning that a major attack was imminent, and two senior Mossad officers appeared in Washington in August with information that there were 200 terrorists resident in the U.S. preparing the attack. They gave the FBI and CIA the names of four of the hijackers.7
Eventually, Congressional investigators were tipped off that President Bush had been warned that Al Qaeda planned to strike the US. Attention came to focus on the president’s August 6 daily briefing, which carried the headline: " Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.," There is no evidence Bush even read the memo. It was presented to him on his first day of his month-long vacation at his Crawford ranch. If he did read it, it may have had little impact upon him as he went off that morning on a fishing expedition. 8 The administration refused to reveal exactly what information it contained or to expand upon what else President Bush may have been told about bin Laden’s intentions and capabilities. Condoleezza Rice stated on May 16, 2002 that Presidential Daily Briefing (PDP) dealt with an historical perspective on Bin Laden’s historical method of operation. She included among those methods hijacking airliners but added that "I don’t think anybody could have predicted that these people would take an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center…." Other administration officials echoed her assertion that no one had thought about the possibility of using airplanes as weapons to crash into buildings. Rice and others also said that while there were warnings about Al Qaeda attacks, they were about assaults on U.S. assets or planes abroad. In truth, this possibility had been discussed in intelligvence circles for several years, and the FBI had been warning about this porspect in the weeks before 9/11.
The evidence that has become public suggests that Dr. Rice and other figures in the Bush administration were telling less than the truth about what was known. If they did not know of the strong possibility that terrorists were likely to attempt to fly airplanes into buildings in the United States it is because they were not doing their homework or because the administration had placed counter terrorism on the back burner. A 1993 Pentagon study raised the possibility that an airplane could be used as a bomb to a national landmark. There were four known efforts to fly airplanes into buildings in 1994, one was by an Al Qaeda related group that tried to send a plane into the Eiffrel Tower. A massive plan , called Project Bojinka,"was unearthed in the Philippines which included an option for flying planes into "key structures" in the United States. Among them were the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the Sears Tower, the White House, and the Transamerica Tower. One of the captured pilots had been trained in the U.S. and said he was to fly into the CIA headquarters. In his 1995 World Trade Center bombing trial, Ramsi Youse talked about flying a plane into the CIA headquarters, and he had earlier mentioned to FBI agents the possibility of doing this to the Pentagon. CIA agents reported in August , 1998 that terrorists were planning to capture a plane in a foreign country and fly into the World Trade Center. In 1999, the National Security Council learned, based on information gathered from a Pakistani arrested in the Philippines that "suicide bomber [s] belonging to al-Qaeda’s Martyrdom Battalion could crash land an aircraft packed with high explosives ( c-4 and semtex) into the Pentagon, (CIA), or the White House. There were other intelligence reports of plans to fly bomb-laden planes into various targets the Egyptian Presidential Palace and U.S. airports. Vladimir Putin had warned in August the US that 25 Islamic terrorists were in the US on a major mission, and that number included suicide pilots who were to attack U.S. targets. Jordan accurately provided the name of the Al Qaeda mission to attack U.S. targets, "Big Wedding." Israel warned in mid-August that 50 to 200 Al Qaeda terroists were in the U.S. and gave the CIA a list 19 terrorists who were to be involved in the initial attack. It is known that four of the names were accurate, but the full list was never released.
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